CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1571
18 February 1999

Original: ENGLISH

GROUP OF 21

Draft decision and mandate on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1 "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention".

GE.99-60667

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1572
4 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CHILE, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ITALY, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SLOVAKIA, SPAIN, TURKEY, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND VENEZUELA

Working paper concerning CD action on an APL transfer ban

The Conference on Disarmament has a clear mandate to address conventional disarmament issues. As part of this mandate, we believe the CD has a role to play in strengthening the existing international regime against anti-personnel landmines. This would involve the negotiation of a ban on the transfer of APLs, as a complement to existing international agreements on APLs. There is an expectation that the CD will undertake this work, as evidenced by the strong support accorded to UN General Assembly Resolution 52/38H, which invites the CD to intensify its efforts on APLs.

It is with great pleasure that we note the entry into force of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (the CCW), and the imminent entry into force of the Ottawa Convention. These instruments represent major achievements. However, many major historical users, producers and exporters of APL's, who are also members of the CD, are not for the moment in a position to accede to the Ottawa Convention or the CCW. An APL transfer ban negotiated by the entire CD membership would therefore bring these countries at least some of the way towards the goal of a total APL ban, and in due course encourage increased participation in the existing international instruments. It would moreover play an important role in stemming the supply of APL's by significantly reducing the availability of these weapons which continue to have tragic humanitarian consequences in many regions of the world. The task of implementing a global regime against land-mines would be enhanced if we pursued a transfers ban within the CD.

GE.99-60797

We believe negotiating a transfer ban in the CD would have a number of compelling advantages. It would, from the beginning cover all types of anti-personnel land-mines. Such negotiations would also involve, from the outset, the relevant States not yet party to the Ottawa Convention or the CCW. These negotiations would, we believe, represent another irreversible step forward in the universalisation of the global fight against land-mines. A further advantage of the CD negotiating a transfer ban is that it has the capacity to get down to work on this issue immediately and achieve an expeditious completion of the negotiations. According to the proposals currently before the Conference a consensus exists in favour of the re-appointment of a CD Special Coordinator on APL's. On this basis the CD should move quickly to capitalize on the consensus and re-appoint a Special Coordinator to carry forward the work on this important issue, with a view to the early establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee, given the broad support demonstrated within the CD for that course of action.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1573
4 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

SOUTH AFRICA

Media statement on the decision by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee on the destruction of surplus small arms and light weapons

The South African Government has decided to destroy all surplus small arms rather than sell them. This was announced today by the Chairperson of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), Professor Kader Asmal. It follows a meeting of the NCACC, at which Government Ministers expressed grave concern about the proliferation of small arms which is having a devastating effect on the socio-economic development and reconstruction of civil societies in Southern Africa. Such proliferation endangers the democratic pursuits which are presently being consolidated in the region. The availability of uncontrolled surplus small arms after the resolution of various armed conflicts is one of the sources of illicit small arms.

The United Nations Secretary General's Report on Small Arms of 27 August 1997 recommended, amongst other things, that States should exercise restraint on the transfer of surplus small arms manufactured solely for possession and use by the military and police forces. The Report also recommended that all States should consider the possibility of destroying all surplus small arms.

In accordance with the Government's policy on non-proliferation and arms control, the NCACC decided that redundant small arms in the possession of the South African Government be destroyed rather than sold on a tender basis as done previously. When destruction takes place it will be public, and media representatives will be invited. The legal and technical implications of the destruction of these small arms are presently being considered.

The South African Police Service has already begun the process of its destruction of surplus small arms. On 6 October 1997 the South African Police Service melted down 20 tons of firearms. A total of 4 504 confiscated firearms, including pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns and homemade firearms were also destroyed. The commercial value of these arms is estimated to be in excess of R2 million. Subsequently the South African Police Service has destroyed an additional 11 tons of confiscated ammunition and 10 tons of confiscated small arms, 9 tons of obsolete/outdated ammunition and 20 tons of redundant/obsolete small arms.

"This decision forms part of the Government's strategy to curtail the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms. The magnitude of the problem is of such a nature that it can only be addressed through appropriate national, regional and international action. We have begun on a national scale in South Africa," said the NCACC Chairperson.

RELEASED ON BEHALF OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL COMMITTEE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CAPE TOWN
25 FEBRUARY 1999

GE.99-60604

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1574
9 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Working Paper

Nuclear Disarmament: Substantive Discussion in the Conference on Disarmament

The purpose of this working paper is to set out considerations relevant to the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues which Canada has long advocated should take place in the CD.

Context:

Canada's policy objective is to secure the elimination of nuclear weapons. We have accepted that this objective must be achieved through a series of measures over time given the political, strategic security and technical complexity of the issue. At the same time this is not an open-ended process and the five Nuclear-Weapon States, which have primary responsibility in this context, are committed to "the determined pursuit .... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons ...". The recognition by Canada of the primary responsibility of the five Nuclear-Weapon States is accompanied by a strong assertion of the political and security interest of Canada in nuclear disarmament as well as of its legal undertaking under Article VI of the NPT to be a responsible contributor to and participant in that process. This is matched by an equally strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, that is, the prevention wherever possible and the roll-back wherever necessary of the spread of nuclear weapons to states other than the five Nuclear-Weapon States.

A corollary of the above is the assertion by Canada that the CD has a contribution to make in the field of nuclear disarmament, with that contribution falling into two categories:

(a) the negotiation of appropriate multilateral instruments (e.g. CTBT, FMCT) as appropriate and agreed; and,

(b) the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues through which the international community can be better informed on a continuing basis, can express its views as to the process, and can identify issues which might be subject to multilateral negotiations.

Each of these are significant and mutually reinforcing. The substantive discussion of any issue under (b) in no way implies agreement to negotiate that issue under (a). Specifically, for example, substantive discussion of the nuclear weapons reduction process through START would not in any manner predispose or lead to the assumption that the CD would ever negotiate such reductions; such negotiations remain the perogative of the Nuclear-Weapon States.

CD 99-60827

Issues:

Various suggestions have been made concerning issues or "programmes of issues" which should be discussed in the CD. Set out below in a sequential thematic manner are issue areas which, inter alia, Canada suggests could be subjects of discussion:

1) Rationales for Possession/Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

2) Theories of Deterrence

3) Strategic and Tactical Weapons: Distinctions and Doctrines

4) START Process: Stages and Elements

5) Transparency of Strategic/Tactical Inventories

6) Measures to Promote Irreversibility

7) Viability of the ABM Treaty

8) Unilateral Efforts

9) Related Steps
   a) Information on Missile Launchings/Early Warning
   b) Material Management and Disposition
   c) Operational Measures:
      e.g. - Demating
      e.g. - Dealerting

These are only a number of categories on which substantive discussion would take place. Several (e.g. No. 4 on the START Process) may have a wide range of clarifications considered desirable.

Relevant also is the question of what the CD should not or would not do. As Canada has frequently stated over the past year this should also be the subject of prior discussion and agreement.

Mechanism/Mandate

This is of "extremely high priority" (CD/1500) for Canada. We consider that ongoing substantive discussions of nuclear disarmament issues should take place in the CD, preferably with the clear objective of identifying specific issues appropriate for multilateral negotiations in the CD at some time. At this time two options for action by the CD exist:

Option A: establishment of a standing mechanism (the title is not critical) for the substantive ongoing discussion of nuclear disarmament issues per the Canada proposal (CD/1568) or the Belgium et al proposal (CD/1565) as amended (i.e. with the deletion in line 2 of the wording "study ways and means of" so to read "to establish an exchange ....");

Option B: (if agreement is not possible on Option A): continuing intensive consultations by the Presidency using an "enhanced troika" process building upon the agreement reached in 1998 as reflected in paragraph 3 of CD/1566 tabled by the former President of the CD on 02 February 1999; in this context the mandate of this enhanced troika process could be the proposal by Belgium et al without amendment. Other additional elements for an enhanced troika might include: regular meetings (i.e. every two weeks); focusing on written proposals; regular reporting to the Plenary.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1575
10 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

Proposal by the President
on the programme of work for the 1999 session of the CD

The Conference on Disarmament takes the following decisions:

1. To re-establish, for the duration of its 1999 session, the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

2. To re-establish, for the duration of its 1999 session, the Ad hoc Committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

3. To establish, under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an Ad Hoc Working Group to exchange information and views on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament with a view to identifying measures that could be subject of negotiations in the Conference.

In discharging its functions, the Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account current efforts and existing proposals and views, as well as proposals that may emerge from the study and discussion.

The Ad Hoc Working Group shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

4. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" to continue to seek the views of its Members with a view to developing consensus on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on this item.

5. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into account, inter alia, developments outside the Conference.

6. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

7. In implementing these decisions, the Special Coordinators shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future, and present early and regular reports on the outcome of their consultations throughout the session and final reports before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

8. The taking of these decisions contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 does not prejudge the positions of delegations on, or the eventual establishment of, further subsidiary bodies on the issues identified, but reflects agreement to advance the Conference's work with a view to reaching consensus. This decision is also taken without prejudice to the rights of Members of the Conference to move forward with positions and proposals already made or to be put forward in the future.

9. The Conference also decides to re-appoint Special Coordinators on the Review of its Agenda, the Expansion of its Membership and its Improved and Effective Functioning. These Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties and functions, will take into account all proposals and views, as well as future initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to report to it before the conclusion of its 1999 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1576
11 March 1999

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE

CHINA

Re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its mandate: draft decision

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish, under item 3 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", an ad hoc committee to negotiate the conclusion of an international legal instrument banning the testing, deployment and use of any weapons, weapon systems or components thereof in outer space, with a view to preventing the weaponization of outer space.

2. The ad hoc committee shall, in carrying out its mandate, take into consideration all relevant proposals, present and future; it shall report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1576 *
18 March 1999

ENGLISH

CHINA

Draft decision on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its mandate:

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to reestablish under item 3 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument banning the test, deployment and use of any weapons, weapon systems and their components in outer space, with a view to preventing the weaponization of outer space.

2. In carrying out its mandate, the ad hoc committee shall take into consideration all relevant proposals present and future and report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

*/Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.99-60904

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1577
18 March 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 12 MARCH 1999 IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFICIAL ENTRY OF POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC INTO NATO

I have the honour to attach a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 12 March 1999 in connection with the official entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.

I would be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed among the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the CD participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Vasily S. Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Today Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic officially join the North Atlantic Alliance. In this connection I would like to emphasize that Russia's attitude to NATO enlargement has not changed, and remains negative. The enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance will not be conducive to the strengthening of trust and stability in international relations, but on the contrary may lead to the creation of new lines of division. We do not desire such a development. It is not in the interests of the peoples of our continent.

For its part, and as a constructive alternative to the enlargement, Russia is pursuing, and advocates the stepping up of, efforts to create a European security architecture which would safeguard the interests of all States without exception - both members and non-members of particular military-political alliances. We are convinced that the construction of a reliable system of European security and stability is possible only on a pan-European basis, in a context of unswerving respect for international law, and using the potential of OSCE as the most representative and universal all-European organization which can address all the challenges of the twenty-first century - political, economic, military and humanitarian. We call on all interested countries to speedily draw up and adopt at the OSCE summit in November this year a European Security Charter - an important document which would expand and translate into reality the vision of a single zone of democracy and security, and would contain practical agreements on the principles underpinning the European architecture, on mutual relations, and on cooperation between European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Of special significance now, following NATO enlargement, is the question of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty). It is Russia's presumption that the obligation assumed by all States parties to the Treaty to complete work by the end of March on key aspects of the adaptation of the Treaty to the new circumstances will be discharged, and that this very important instrument for stability will retain its effectiveness.

Russia is also continuing its active efforts to make use of the potential of the Russia-NATO Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council with the aim of establishing relations of genuine partnership between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance, and preventing any actions which might jeopardize the goal of moulding a single Euro-Atlantic area of stability, democracy and cooperation without lines of division. We count on the understanding and conciliatory attitude of our partners. Only this process - and not backsliding into the logic of the "cold war" - can ensure peace and prosperity.

Moscow, 12 March 1999

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1578
18 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Working Paper

Elements of an Approach To Dealing With Stocks of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Canada indicated in its statement of March 18, 1999, concerning the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" its considered view as to how the issue of fissile material stockpiles should be addressed by those states possessing such stockpiles. This should be separate from but parallel with the negotiation of that treaty. In an effort to outline elements of such an approach, the following information and recommendations are put forward. It is emphasized that this approach is, in Canada's view, an integral part of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation programme directed to the elimination of nuclear weapons and of any associated stockpiles of fissile materials for that purpose.

The suggested approach is composed of four categories of measures:

a) increasing transparency;

b) declarations of excess fissile material;

c) placing excess fissile material under verification;

and,

d) disposition of excess fissile material.

Each category is briefly expanded upon in the following sections.

A. Increasing Transparency

The collection and release of information about the size of current plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) inventories is necessary in addressing the issue of excess stocks. Aggregate quantities of stocks are needed as a baseline to measure the progress of establishing controls and disposition programmes on these stocks. Accurate accounting of these stocks also serves an important disarmament and nonproliferation objective for each state possessing such stocks by ensuring that fissile materials have not been stolen or diverted. In that context, efforts to establish production histories will increase confidence that the measured inventories are correct.

Both the United States and the UK have released data about their stocks, and have promised to release more. France's nuclear programme is regarded as having as sophisticated a nuclear material accounting system as the United States and the UK, and should, with relative ease, be able to compile and release similar information about its stocks. Little is known about the accounting systems used by China. Whether the Russian Federation has compiled or is now compiling this information is unknown. The impression is that the Russian Federation needs to develop a modern, nation-wide system to account for its fissile materials; it may be several years before one is developed.

Nonetheless, it is important that states in possession of stocks begin the process of collecting data about their stocks and their production histories. The U.S. and British experiences show that over the passage of time, it becomes more difficult to compile this information as facilities close, records are destroyed, and key personnel who understand the inventories retire or pass away.

Recommendation:

(1) *An agreement among the five nuclear-weapon states to create, regularly update and publish information about their fissile stocks should be concluded as an important transparency measure. Negotiating such an agreement also would focus attention by these governments on the need to thoroughly audit their own stocks.*

B. Declarations of Excess Fissile Material

As nuclear arms reductions take effect, or as the nuclear-weapon states decide unilaterally to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals, the fissile materials contained in these nuclear weapons becomes excess to weapons programmes. Excess stocks may also arise from materials in the nuclear weapons production process as decisions are made to shut down production facilities. By declaring these materials excess, these states would undertake a political commitment to refrain from using these materials in weapons.

The United States, the UK and the Russian Federation have declared about one-third of their stocks to be excess, i.e. the United States has declared approximately 227 tonnes (metric tons) of fissile material (including approximately 176 tonnes of HEU and 50 tonnes of plutonium) to be excess; the UK has declared 4.4 tonnes of plutonium to be excess, but has not declared any HEU to be excess; and the Russian Federation has declared, in principle, that 500 tonnes of HEU and 50 tonnes of plutonium are excess.

Greater quantities of such fissile materials could be declared excess by these states. Both the United States and the Russian Federation retain far more fissile materials in their programmes than needed to support future nuclear weapons arsenals, given reasonable assumptions about the future size of these arsenals. It is estimated that approximately 75 percent of Russian and U.S. inventories are currently contained outside active nuclear weapons. The United States, the UK and the Russian Federation also retain a far larger quantity of HEU than needed to support their naval nuclear propulsion programmes over the long term.

China and France have not declared any of their stocks to be excess.

Recommendation:

(2) All five nuclear-weapon states should assess their nuclear weapons requirements and declare appropriate amounts of fissile materials to be excess. They should declare the quantity of fissile materials needed to sustain current and projected nuclear forces and naval programmes. Public commitments that additional materials will be declared excess, based on projections of future need and contingent on arms reductions, also should be made.

C. Placing Excess Fissile Material under Verification

Verification that excess fissile materials are not returned to nuclear weapons is essential to confidently reducing the size of fissile material stocks. International verification agreements would make legally binding the political commitments by states not to reuse excess materials for weapons.

The United States has placed 12 tonnes of fissile material (10 tonnes of HEU and 2 tonnes of plutonium) under voluntary International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and a few tonnes of U.S. HEU have been diluted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) under IAEA monitoring. The UK is placing its excess plutonium under Euratom safeguards and has agreed not to remove these materials from safeguards for weapons purposes. The Russian Federation has not placed any of its excess material under safeguards, although approximately 50 tonnes of Russian HEU has been diluted to LEU under U.S. monitoring. China and France have not placed any of their stocks under international controls.

The United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA are currently engaged in a "Trilateral Initiative" to develop the technical, legal, and financial mechanisms to place excess, weapons-programme origin fissile materials under IAEA verification. Special systems are required to verify, with a high degree of confidence, that the materials subject to IAEA verification indeed originated from weapons programmes, and that they are not returned to weapons, without revealing classified information about these materials in the process. The three parties are also drafting a model agreement that would commit a nuclear-weapon state not to use excess materials placed under IAEA verification in nuclear weapons. The three parties are expected to complete their work in 2000.

Recommendations:

(3) The five nuclear-weapon states should place as much excess fissile material as possible irreversibly under international verification as soon as practicable.

(4) To ensure the broad participation by all of the nuclear-weapon states in the Trilateral Initiative's outcome, UK, China and France should be invited to take part in the initiative. At a minimum, these three nuclear-weapon states should be regularly informed about the Trilateral Initiative's progress, and be allowed to comment on its efforts. In particular, these states should have an opportunity to comment on the draft model verification agreement.

(5) Implementing IAEA verification of excess stocks will place new financial strains on the Agency's safeguards budget. To address this concern, methods to create new funding mechanisms, such as proposed by the IAEA Director General, should be evaluated.

D. Disposition of Excess Fissile Material

Converting excess HEU and plutonium into forms that are unusable or unattractive for use in nuclear weapons is necessary to ensure that these materials are permanently removed from stocks.

Efforts to dispose of HEU and plutonium are now underway:

HEU Disposition. In 1993, the Russian Federation agreed to dilute 500 tonnes of weapon-grade HEU to LEU and to sell the resulting product to the United States over a 20-year period. While the agreement has periodically been beset by economic and financing concerns, so far it has proceeded relatively smoothly. Through the end of 1998, 50 tonnes of Russian HEU have been blended down and sold to the United States.

The United States has also begun to blend down excess HEU. Thirteen tonnes of HEU were blended down by the United States in 1997-1998. Additional HEU stocks-up to 88 tonnes -- are to be transferred to commercial processors in the United States and blended down for use in reactors by early in the next decade. When completed, the United States will have disposed of more than half of the currently declared excess HEU.

Plutonium Disposition. The United States and the Russian Federation are now engaged in negotiations on an agreement to cooperate on the disposition of plutonium. The preferred method of the Russian Federation is to convert excess plutonium to oxide form, mix it with uranium oxide, and fabricate mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for use in nuclear reactors. The United States is also considering the "MOX option" for much of its excess plutonium, and would vitrify the rest in high-level waste ("immobilization").

These negotiations, begun in late 1998 are expected to be completed soon. However, whatever the outcome of these negotiations, it is uncertain if there will be sufficient financing to pay for plutonium disposition, particularly in the Russian Federation. Although the United States recently agreed to spend up to $200 million to support Russian plutonium disposition, other countries will be invited to contribute financially to the effort. Even if sufficient financing becomes available, it will take years to construct the necessary facilities in both countries for large-scale plutonium disposition. Disposition activities themselves will take decades.

Recommendations:

(6) Each nuclear-weapon state should commit to the disposition of its excess plutonium and HEU.

(7) Each nuclear-weapon state should commit to the safe storage of excess plutonium and HEU, preferably in forms less usable in nuclear weapons than metal nuclear weapons components.

(8) HEU disposition programmes should be accelerated to blend down excess HEU by the earliest possible date.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1579
25 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH
FRENCH AND SPANISH

GERMANY
(on behalf of the European Union)

JOINT ACTION

of 17 December 1998

adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons

(1999/34/CFSP)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article J.3 thereof,

Having regard to the general guidelines of the European Council held on 26 and 27 June 1992, which identified the areas falling within the security sphere which could, as from the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, be the subject of joint actions,

Whereas the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (hereafter referred to as 'small arms') (1) has become a problem of great concern to the international community and this phenomenon poses a threat to peace and security and reduces the prospects for sustainable development in many regions of the world;

Whereas the European Union welcomes the adoption and declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in Ecowas Member States by the Authority of Heads of State or Government of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) at its 21st session;

Whereas the UN Security Council adopted unanimously on 19 November 1998 Resolution 1209 (1998) on the situation in Africa, illicit arms flows to and in Africa;

Whereas the UN General Assembly addressed, in particular in Resolutions 52/38J on Small arms and 52/38G on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, the problems caused by the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms;

Whereas the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms has been reestablished by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolution 52/38J, to continue the work already accomplished under the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms;

Whereas the UN Economic and Social Council recommended that States work towards the elaboration of an international instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition within the context of a United Nations convention against transnational organised crime;

Whereas the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) is actively pursuing its efforts in the fight against the criminal use of firearms,

Whereas in the spirit of the 'Brussels call for action' and in the interest of upholding State responsibility to protect citizen security within a framework of good governance and integrated approach to security and sustainable development it is required to take comprehensive measures for the elimination of uncontrolled circulation of small arms;

Whereas the present initiative builds on, and is complementary to already existing EU initiatives, in particular the EU programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms adopted by the Council on 26 June 1997 and the EU code of conduct on arms exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998;

Whereas the European Community has supported actions of demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and of weapons collection in the context of its humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development cooperation policy,

HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

1. The objectives of this Joint Action are:

(1) See Annex.

— to combat and contribute to ending the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms,

— to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons to levels consistent with countries' legitimate security needs, and

— to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations.

2. This Joint Action entails the following elements:

— building consensus on the principles and measures referred to in Title I,

— making a multifaceted contribution as referred to in Title II.

TITLE I

Principles on preventive and reactive aspects

Article 2

The European Union shall enhance efforts to build consensus in the relevant regional and international forums (e.g. the UN and OSCE) and among affected States on the principles and measures set out in Article 2 and on those set out in Articles 3 and 4 as the basis for regional and incremental approaches to the problem and, where appropriate, global international instruments on small arms.

Article 3

In pursuing the objectives set out in Article 1, the European Union shall aim at building consensus in the relevant international forums, and in a regional context as appropriate, for the realisation of the following principles and measures to prevent the further destabilising accumulation of small arms:

(a) a commitment by all countries to import and hold small arms only for their legitimate security needs, to a level commensurate with their legitimate self-defence and security requirements, including their ability to participate in UN peacekeeping operations;

(b) a commitment by exporting countries to supply small arms only to governments (either directly or through duly licensed entities authorised to procure weapons on their behalf) in accordance with appropriate international and regional restrictive arms export criteria, as provided in particular in the EU code of conduct, including officially authorised end-use certificates or, when appropriate, other relevant information on end-use;

(c) a commitment by all countries to produce small arms only for holdings as outlined in (a) above or exports as outlined in (b) above;

(d) in order to ensure control, the establishment and maintenance of national inventories of legally-held weapons owned by the country's authorities and the establishment of restrictive national weapons legislation for small arms including penal sanctions and effective administrative control;

(e) the establishment of confidence building measures, including measures to promote increased transparency and openness, through regional registers on small arms and regular exchanges of available information, on exports, imports, production and holdings of small arms, and on national weapons legislation, and through consultations between the relevant parties on the information exchanged;

(f) the commitment to combat illicit trafficking of small arms through the implementation of effective national controls, such as efficient border and customs mechanisms, regional and international cooperation and enhanced information exchange;

(g) the commitment to challenge and reverse 'cultures of violence', by enhancing public involvement through public education and awareness programmes.

Article 4

In pursuing the objectives set out in Article 1, the efforts of the European Union shall aim at building consensus in the relevant international forums, and in a regional context as appropriate, for the realisation of the following principles and measures to reduce existing accumulations of small arms:

(a) the assistance as appropriate to countries requesting support for controlling or eliminating surplus small arms on their territory, in particular where this may help to prevent armed conflict or in post-conflict situations;

(b) the promotion of confidence-building measures and incentives to encourage the voluntary surrender of surplus or illegally-held small arms, the demobilisation of combatants and their subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration, such measures to include compliance with peace and arms control agreements under combined or third-party supervision, respect of human rights and humanitarian law, the protection of the rule of law, in particular as regards the personal safety of former combatants and small arms amnesties, as well as community-based development project and other economic and social incentives;

(c) the effective removal of surplus small arms encompassing safe storage as well as quick and effective destruction of these weapons, preferably under international supervision;

(d) the rendering of assistance through appropriate international organisations, programmes and agencies as well as regional arrangements.

Article 5

The Member States will promote, where appropriate, in the context of resolving armed conflicts,

(a) the inclusion of provisions with regard to demobilisation, elimination of surplus weapons and integration of ex-combatants into peace agreements between the parties to the conflict, into mandates of peace-support operations or other relevant missions in support of the peaceful settlement,

(b) the consideration of the possibility of making necessary provision for measures ensuring the removal of small arms in the context of demobilisation by the UN Security Council in case the country or parties concerned are not in a position to comply with the relevant obligations.

TITLE II

Contribution by the European Union to specific actions

Article 6

1. The Union will provide financial and technical assistance to programmes and projects which make a direct and identifiable contribution to the principles and measures referred to in Title I, including relevant programmes or projects conducted by the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, other international organisations and regional arrangements and NGOs. Such projects might include, *inter alia*, weapons collection, security sector reform and demobilisation and reintegration programmes as well as specific victim assistance programmes.

2. In providing such assistance, the EU shall take into account in particular the recipient's commitments to comply with the principles mentioned in Article 3; their respect of human rights; their compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of the rule of law; and their compliance with their international commitments, in particular with regard to existing peace treaties and international arms control agreements.

Article 7

1. The Council shall decide on:

— the allocation of the financial and technical contribution referred to in Article 6,

— the priorities for the use of those funds,

— the conditions for implementing specific actions of the Union, including the possibility of designating, in certain instances, a person responsible for its implementation.

2. The Council shall decide on the principle, arrangements and financing of such projects on the basis of concrete and properly-costed project proposals and on a case-by-case basis, without prejudice to Member States' bilateral contributions and operation of the European Community.

3. The Presidency shall, under the conditions set out in Article J.5(3) of the Treaty:

— ensure liaison with the United Nations and any other relevant organisation involved,

— establish, with regional arrangements and third countries, the contacts needed to implement the Union's specific actions.

It shall keep the Council informed.

Article 8

The Council notes that the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and the priorities of this Joint Action, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures.

Article 9

1. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the consistency of the Union's activities in the field of small arms, in particular with regard to its development policies. For this purpose, Member States and the Commission shall submit any relevant information to the relevant Council bodies. The Council and the Commission shall ensure implementation of their respective action, each in accordance with its powers.

2. Member States shall equally seek to increase the effectiveness of their national actions in the field of small arms. As far as possible, actions taken pursuant to Article 6 shall be coordinated with those of Member States and of the European Community.

Article 10

The Council will review annually the actions taken in the framework of this Joint Action.

Article 11

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Article 12

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal.

Done at Brussels, 17 December 1998.

For the Council
The President
W. MOLTERER

ANNEX

The Joint Action shall apply to the following categories of weapons, while not prejudging any future internationally agreed definition of small arms and light weapons. These categories may be subject to further clarification, and may be reviewed in the light of any such future internationally agreed definition.

(a) Small arms and accessories specially designed for military use

- machine-guns (including heavy machine-guns),
- submachine-guns, including machine pistols,
- fully automatic rifles,
- semi-automatic rifles, if developed and/or introduced as a model for an armed force,
- moderators (silencers).

(b) Man or crew-portable light weapons

- cannon (including automatic cannon), howitzers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre,
- grenade launchers,
- anti-tank weapons, recoilless guns (shoulder-fired rockets),
- anti-tank missiles and launchers,
- anti-aircraft missiles/man-portable air defence systems (Manpads).

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1580
26 March 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 25 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 18 MARCH 1999 IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION BY THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF A BILL ON DEPLOYMENT OF A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement made by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on 18 March 1999 in connection with the adoption by the Senate of the United States of America of a bill on the deployment of a national missile defence system.

I should be grateful if this statement could be published as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to delegations of all States Members of the Conference and all non-member States which are participating in the work of the Conference.

[Signed]

Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Russia to the Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT BY THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA

According to information to hand, the Senate of the United States of America has adopted a bill on deployment of a national missile defence system, i.e. an ABM system for the territory of the country. As is well known, deployment of such a system is prohibited by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 1972.

The bill calls on the American Administration to elevate the establishment of a national ABM system to the level of United States policy, and to begin its deployment as soon as is technologically possible.

Although Washington persistently emphasizes that no decision concerning deployment of such a system will be taken before the year 2000, the direction in which the American Senate is now moving is in point of fact towards the wrecking of the ABM Treaty, and with it the entire structure of agreements on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The ABM Treaty and the START Treaties are, as it were, component parts of a single whole. It is no coincidence that the interrelationship between the preservation of this Treaty and the possibility of reducing strategic offensive arms is clearly expressed both in the ABM Treaty itself and in the START-I and START-II Treaties.

That is why, in accordance with the Statement made upon signature of the START-I Treaty, for the Russian side the extraordinary events that would permit it to withdraw from this Treaty also include a situation related to withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, or related to material breach of that Treaty.

It is, therefore, a question, as we see it, of a serious threat to the whole nuclear arms limitation process, as well as to the stability of a strategic situation that decades of elaboration of major international agreements have been designed to strengthen.

18 March 1999

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1581
26 March 1999

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE RIO GROUP ON 25 MARCH 1999 ON THE START OF AIR STRIKES ON SERB MILITARY TARGETS BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to attach herewith the communiqué issued by the Rio Group on 25 March 1999 on the start of air strikes on Serb military targets by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Permanent Mission of Mexico requests the secretariat of the Conference to distribute the communiqué as a document for the information of the Conference.

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE RIO GROUP

The member countries of the Rio Group express their concern about the start of air strikes on Serb military targets by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, in particular, about the fact that no peaceful solution has been found, in accordance with international law, to the dispute between the parties involved in the conflict in Kosovo.

The Rio Group therefore urges all parties to resume their talks as rapidly as possible in order to achieve a full and final agreement which will re-establish a firm and lasting peace based on respect for the human rights of all ethnic groups and minorities, and for the territorial integrity of the States, in the region.

The Rio Group also regrets that force has been used in this Balkan region without regard for the provisions of Article 53, paragraph 1, and Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, which read: "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council" and "The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of the activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security".

Mexico City, 25 March 1999

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1582
30 March 1999

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF BULGARIA AND TURKEY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN SOFIA ON 22 MARCH 1999 ON NON-USE OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES AND THEIR REMOVAL FROM OR DESTRUCTION IN THE AREAS OF THEIR COMMON BORDER

We have the nonour to transmit herewith the text of the Joint Statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria H.E. Ms. Nadezhda Mihailova and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem on the agreement signed in Sofia on 22 March 1999, on non-use of anti-personnel landmines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to our common border.

We would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Petko Draganov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

(Signed) Murat Sungar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Sofia, 22 March 1999

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY H.E. MR. ISMAIL CEM AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA H.E. MS. NADEZHDA MIHAILOVA

On the occasion of the visit of H.E. Süleyman Demirel, President of the Republic of Turkey to Bulgaria, at the invitation of H.E. Petar Stoyanov, President of the Republic of Bulgaria, an agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on non-use of anti-personnel mines and their removal from or destruction in the areas adjacent to their common border is signed in Sofia, on 22 March 1999, by H.E. Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey and H.E. Nadezhda Mihailova, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria.

According to the Agreement, the two countries undertake not to use under any circumstances anti-personnel mines and to destroy or remove all stocked or emplaced anti-personnel mines from the area of application as defined in the Aggrement. The Agreement also envisages a verification regime.

Aware of the human sufferings and casualties caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of the anti-personnel mines, by signing this Agreement the two countries have proved their determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at the total elimination of this inhuman weapon.

This Agreement is an expression of the achieved quality of the relations between the two countries and underline the common will to further strengthen the existing friendly relations between them and contribute to stability, security and transparency in the region.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1583
1 April 1999

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 31 MARCH 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY MR. B.N. YELTSIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ON 24 MARCH 1999 IN CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY ACTION BY NATO IN YUGOSLAVIA

I have the honour to transmit a statement made by the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, on 24 March 1999, in connection with the military action by NATO in Yugoslavia.

I would be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed among the delegations of all member States of the CD participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed:) Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.99-61160 (E)

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation

NATO's military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing other than naked aggression, has caused profound indignation in Russia.

The United Nations Security Council alone has the right to decide which measures, including force, should be taken to uphold or restore international peace and security. The Security Council has taken no such decisions concerning Yugoslavia. Not only the Charter of the United Nations, but also the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and NATO, have been breached. A dangerous precedent has been set for the revival of the policy of imposing one's will by force, and the entire modern international legal order has been jeopardized.

In fact, what is involved is an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of a world policeman. Russia will never agree to this.

The United Nations Security Council should examine the situation which has developed and demand the immediate cessation of NATO's actions involving the use of force.

For its part, the leadership of the Russian Federation will review its links with NATO as an organization which has displayed a lack of respect for the basic underpinnings of the system of international relations.

In my capacity as President and Supreme Commander I have already given orders to:

- Cut short the visit to the United States by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, E.M. Primakov;

- Demand the urgent convening of a meeting of the United Nations Security Council and the immediate halting of the military action by NATO;

- Recall to Moscow the Russian Federation's chief military representative to NATO;

- Suspend our participation in the "Partnership for Peace" programme and the implementation of the programme falling under the Russia-NATO partnership;

- Postpone talks on the opening of a NATO military communications mission in Moscow.

I have already contacted United States President B. Clinton, and I also call on the leaders of other NATO member States to put an immediate end to this military adventure, which threatens the lives of peaceable people and may cause an explosion in the Balkans.

The situation in Kosovo, like other similar problems, can be resolved only through negotiations. The sooner they are resumed, the more scope the international community will have to find a political settlement. Russia is ready to continue to work closely with the other members of the Contact Group in order to achieve this goal.

Those who embarked on this military adventure will bear full responsibility before their peoples and the world community for its extremely grave consequences for international stability. In the event that the military conflict spreads, Russia reserves the right to take appropriate measures, including military measures, to ensure its own security and that of Europe as a whole.

24 March 1999

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1584
28 April 1999

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 28 APRIL 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE ACTING HEAD OF DELEGATION OF CHINA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING A JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE ABM TREATY

On 14 April 1999, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, G.E. Mamedov, and the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Guangya, held consultations on issues of strategic stability in Moscow. After the consultations, the two sides issued a joint press communiqué on issues related to the ABM Treaty.

We would be grateful if you would issue and circulate the joint communiqué as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Vasily S. SIDOROV
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
Head of Delegation of
the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed) WANG Xiaoyu
Acting Head
of Delegation of China
to the Conference on
Disarmament

Russian-Chinese press communiqué on consultations on issues related to the ABM Treaty

In accordance with the agreement reached between the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 25 February 1999, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, G.E. Mamedov, and the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Guangya, held consultations on issues of strategic stability in Moscow on 14 April 1999. Military and diplomatic experts from both sides participated in the consultations.

Particular attention was devoted to discussion of the situation developing in relation to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty). The discussion of this problem was based on the understanding set out in the joint statement entitled "Russian-Chinese relations on the threshold of the twenty-first century" issued on 23 November 1998 at the end of the Russian-Chinese summit meeting, concerning the critical importance of preserving and strengthening the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was and remains a cornerstone of efforts to maintain strategic stability in the world.

The two sides voiced their grave concern at the fact that plans announced in the United States to prepare a national anti-missile defence system for deployment are currently posing a serious threat that the ABM Treaty may be undermined. The implementation of such plans would constitute a violation of a fundamental obligation under the ABM Treaty - the obligation not to deploy ABM systems for the defence of national territory and not to provide a base for such a defence.

The two sides consider that the undermining or violation of the ABM Treaty would lead to a series of negative consequences: the emergence of new factors which could destabilize the international situation both at the global and at the regional level, and of conditions for the resumption of the arms race and for the creation of additional obstacles to the process of disarmament.

In the developing situation, Russia and China consider it necessary to draw the attention of the international community in the most serious manner to the consequences which might result from a violation of the ABM Treaty.

On the basis of its traditional interest in supporting strategic stability and strengthening international security, China, which is not a party to the ABM Treaty, declares its solidarity with the efforts being made by Russia to prevent the Treaty from being undermined or circumvented. Russia, for its part, fully supports China's efforts to enhance international and regional stability. The two sides express their concern that the realization of the existing plans for the creation and deployment of an ABM system by a number of countries in the Asia and Pacific region could cause an increase in tension in areas of conflict in that region.

The two sides declare their readiness to continue in the future, as the situation develops, to discuss and cooperate in respect of issues related to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, as well as associated problems.

Moscow, 14 April 1999

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1585
4 May 1999

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 3 MAY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECREE ISSUED ON 22 MARCH 1999 BY THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE MORATORIUM ON THE EXPORT OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

The Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request the distribution as an official document of the Conference of the attached text of a decree issued on 22 March 1999 by the Cabinet of Ministers (Government) of Ukraine on the extension of the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines.

GE.99-61453

DECREE OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF UKRAINE

No. 426 dated 22 March 1999

Kyiv

On the extension of the moratorium on the export
by Ukraine of anti-personnel landmines

In support of United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/38H dated 9 December 1997, the Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine decided to extend for four years the moratorium on the export by Ukraine of all types of anti-personnel landmines, established by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 686 dated 27 August 1995.

Prime-Minister of Ukraine V. Pustovoitenko

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1586
20 May 1999

Original: ENGLISH

FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working paper
on the programme of work of the Conference

A. DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION

After having identified agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" as being of an extremely high priority, and in the light of the intensive consultations on this item held by successive Presidents in the course of 1998 following the President's Declaration made on 26 March 1998 (CD/1500), the President concluded that it was essential substantially to intensify such consultations under his authority by using all possibilities, including the assistance of the outgoing and the incoming Presidents, in a strengthened, more structured and more transparent way, with a view to reaching consensus on how to deal with this item, taking into account current efforts and all existing proposals and views.

The Presidency is thus willing to continue to consider agenda item 1 as its first priority and substantially to intensify its vigorous efforts in this respect, including:

a) by consulting on ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views within the Conference on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament;

b) by holding informal open-ended consultations at least once during each Presidency;

c) by consulting with delegations, including those which have made proposals in respect of agenda item 1, during each Presidency;

d) and by presenting interim reports on these consultations at the end of each Presidency and a final report before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

B. DRAFT DECISION ON THE WORK PROGRAMME

The Conference on Disarmament takes the following decisions:

1. To re-establish, for the duration of the 1999 session, the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These agreements could take the form of an internationally legally-binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of work before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

2. To re-establish, under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of t nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate, the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mand contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall immediately commence negotiations with a view their early conclusion; it shall meet in successive sessions of the Confere until its work is completed, without the need for annual reauthorization. Committee shall submit periodic reports to the Conference, including an inte report at the end of each session and a final report transmitting the text of draft treaty.

3. That the Presidency, taking into account the statement (CD/....) made by President at the .... plenary meeting on .... 1999, shall substantially intens consultations and seek the views of its Members on appropriate methods approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear a race and nuclear disarmament", taking into consideration all proposals and vi on this item, and report at the end of each Presidency including a final rep before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

4. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 3 entitled "Prevent of an arms race in outer space" to seek the views of its Members on the m appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

5. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 6 entit "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek the views of its Members on most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmi taking into account, *inter alia*, developments outside the Conference.

6. To re-appoint a Special Coordinator under agenda item 7 entit "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of its Members on the m appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

7. In implementing these decisions, the Special Coordinators shall take i consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future, and pres early and regular reports on the outcome of their consultations throughout session.

8. The taking of these decisions contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 does prejudge the positions of delegations on, or the eventual establishment of, furt subsidiary bodies on the issues identified, but reflects agreement to advance Conference's work with a view to reaching consensus. This decision is also ta without prejudice to the rights of Members of the Conference to move forward w positions and proposals already made or to be put forward in the future.

9. The Conference also decides to re-appoint Special Coordinators on the Rev of its Agenda, the Expansion of its Membership and its Improved and Effect Functioning. These Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties functions, will take into account all proposals and views, as well as fut initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to report to before the conclusion of the 1999 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1587
25 June 1999

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, HELD IN MAPUTO, 3-7 MAY 1999

I have the honour to transmit to you the Final Report of the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

I would be grateful if the attention of the ember and participating non-member delegations of the Conference on Disarmament be drawn to this document */.

(Signed) Bjørn Skogmo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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*/ The Final Report is contained in document APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, dated 20 May 1999, which has already been distributed to all United Nations Member States and Observers.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1588
5 August 1999

Original: ENGLISH

Decision

on the Expansion of the Membership of the Conference on Disarmament
(adopted by the Conference at its 831st plenary meeting on 5 August 1999)

The Conference on Disarmament:

Recognizing the importance attached to the question of expansion of its membership,

Confirming the necessity to review its membership at regular intervals, as contained in Rule 2 of its Rules of Procedure,

And without prejudging the consideration to be given to past, present and future applications for membership to the Conference,

Decides, as a further step within this approach, to admit Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia as its members as of 5 August 1999.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1589
11 August 1999

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF REMARKS MADE BY PRESIDENT CLINTON ON 23 JULY, WHEN HE SIGNED THE "NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999"

Attached is the text of remarks made by President Clinton on 23 July, when he signed the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999".

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all Member States and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed) Robert T. Grey, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.99-65417

The White House, Washington, D.C.
July 23, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have signed into law H.R. 4, the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999." My Administration is committed to addressing the growing danger that rogue nations may develop and field long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies.

Section 2 of this Act states that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for NMD. By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, the legislation makes clear that no decision on deployment has been made. This interpretation, which is confirmed by the legislative record taken as a whole, is also required to avoid any possible impairment of my constitutional authorities.

Section 3 of the Act states that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Thus, section 3 puts the Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic missile arms, reaffirming my Administration's position that our missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

Next year, we will, for the first time, determine whether to deploy a limited National Missile Defense, when we review the results of flight tests and other developmental efforts, consider cost estimates, and evaluate the threat. Any NMD system we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In making our determination, we will also review progress in achieving our arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the ABM Treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible NMD deployment.